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ABSTRACT. The theory of Boolean algebras can be fruitfully applied to judgment
aggregation: Assuming universality, systematicity and a sufficiently rich agenda, there
is a correspondence between (i) non-trivial deductively closed judgment aggregators
and (ii) Boolean algebra homomorphisms defined on the power-set algebra of the
electorate. Furthermore, there is a correspondence between (i) consistent complete
judgment aggregators and (ii) 2-valued Boolean algebra homomorphisms defined on the
power-set algebra of the electorate.
Since the shell of such a homomorphism equals the set of winning coalitions and
since (ultra)filters are shells of (2-valued) Boolean algebra homomorphisms, we suggest
an explanation for the effectiveness of the (ultra)filter method in social choice theory.
From the (ultra)filter property of the set of winning coalitions, one obtains two general
impossibility theorems for judgment aggregation on finite electorates, even without the
Pareto principle.
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21. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the present paper is three-fold: (i) To show that universal systematic
judgment aggregation can be studied by means of Boolean algebras. (ii) To show
that the concept of an (ultra)filter arises naturally when describing systematic judgment
aggregators through Boolean algebras, and thus to explain the effectiveness of the
(ultra)filter methodology in abstract aggregation theory. (iii) To give concise algebraic
proofs of dictatorial and oligarchic impossibility theorems in judgment aggregation. The
thrust of this paper is the second aspect which suggests a new perspective on the (ultra)filter
method.
The use of filters and ultrafilters has been firmly established in the theory of preference
aggregation. Fishburn [7] was the first to apply the ultrafilter concept to prove a possibility
theorem for preference aggregation on infinite electorates, and Kirman and Sondermann
[11] employed the ultrafilter concept to prove that Arrow’s rationality axioms1 imply
dictatorship for finite electorates. Slightly later, Hansson [10] and Brown [2] realized that
the concept of a filter can be used to characterize oligarchies.2 This so-called (ultra)filter
methodology can be summarized as follows: In order to prove impossibility theorems for
finite electorates, one shows, using rationality axioms on the aggregation function, that the
set of all decisive coalitions must be an ultrafilter (filter, respectively) on the power-set of
the electorate. If the electorate is finite, one can then deduce that this set of coalitions must
be the set of all coalitions containing one and the same element (one and the same subset,
repectively), viz. the dictator (set of oligarchs, respectively).
During the past two years, the (ultra)filter method has also been applied in the theory
of judgment aggregation (i.e. aggregation of logical propositions): Eckert and Klamler
[6] employ ultrafilters to prove a simple dictatorial impossibility theorem for judgment
aggregation due to Nehring and Puppe [15], and Dietrich and Mongin [4] prove more
general impossibility results for judgment aggregation, of both oligarchic and dictatorial
kind, by means of (ultra)filters.
The success of the (ultra)filter method in social choice theory has often been simply
attributed to the fact that filters and ultrafilters possess, apparently by some mathematical
coincidence, exactly those set-theoretic closure properties that are also desirable in the
investigation of economic aggregation problems. A notable exception is an article by
Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [12] which shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between ultraproducts3 of preference relations on a given set of alternatives and preference
aggregation functions.
However, one can give a more fundamental explanation for the link between abstract
aggregation theory and (ultra)filters: On the one hand, the concept of a Boolean algebra is
a natural mathematical notion for formalizing abstract aggregation theory as it provides a
unified framework to capture both the algebraic structure of the electorate and the algebraic
structure of the set of truth values. On the other hand, (ultra)filters occur naturally in the
context of Boolean algebras because homomorphisms of Boolean algebras are typically
classified via the pre-image of the 1-element of the image algebra, called shell, and shells
of (2-valued) Boolean algebra homomorphisms are nothing else than (ultra)filters.
In light of this, it is reasonable to ask whether judgment aggregators can, at least under
some rationality assumptions, be conceived of as Boolean algebra homomorphisms and, if
1By “Arrovian rationality axioms” we mean the following four conditions: at least three alternatives;
universality; unanimity preservation (Pareto principle); independence of irrelevant alternatives.
2Monjardet [14] has argued that Guilbaud’s analysis of collective decision making [8] (English translation in
[9]), which appeared around the time of Arrow’s classic Social Choice and Individual Values, implicitly uses the
notion of an ultrafilter.
3An ultraproduct is a model-theoretic construction, obtained from a — finite or infinite — sequence of
structures of the same type, based on an ultrafilter on the index set of the sequence.
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so, whether such a representation allows for an economic interpretation of the shell of a
homomorphism induced by a judgment aggregator.
For sufficiently rich agendas, the answer to both questions turns out to be affirmative.
Assuming universality, systematicity, and an agenda richness condition, we show
through Theorem 3;
• Consistent and complete judgment aggregators correspond to 2-valued Boolean
algebra homomorphisms defined on the power-set algebra of the electorate.
• The shell of any such homomorphism is just the set of all winning coalitions (i.e.
those coalitions which win the collective outcome for some proposition and some
profile).
• Hence the set of all winning coalitions is an ultrafilter if the judgment aggregator
is consistent, complete, universal and systematic.
Theorem 6 generalizes this result. Again assuming universality, systematicity, and an
agenda richness condition:
• Non-trivial deductively closed judgment aggregators correspond to Boolean
algebra homomorphisms defined on the power-set algebra of the electorate.
• The shell of every such homomorphism equals the set of all winning coalitions.
• Hence the set of all winning coalitions is a filter if the judgment aggregator is
non-trivial, deductively closed, universal and systematic.
Under the additional assumption of a finite electorate, we obtain a dictatorial
impossibility theorem for certain complete systematic judgment aggregators and an
oligarchic impossibility theorem for certain deductively closed systematic aggregators.
These impossibility theorems are among the most general versions of Arrow’s theorem
to this day, and are slight variations of results by Dietrich and List [3] and Dietrich and
Mongin [4]. The algebraic methodology of this paper allows us to give remarkably short
proofs of these results.
The paper presents the framework in Section 2 and Section 3. Thereafter, one section
each is devoted to the axioms on judgment aggregators, the results, the proofs, and a
conclusion. Technical footnotes make this article self-contained.
2. JUDGMENT SETS
Let X be a set of sentences in propositional logic, called the agenda. We assume that X
is the union of proposition-negation pairs (i.e. there exists a non-empty set X ′ of sentences
such that X =
⋃
p∈X′ {p,¬p}). For every p ∈ X we denote by ∼p an element q of X
such that either q = ¬p or p = ¬q.
Subsets of X will be called judgment sets, and we denote the power-set of X by P(X).
Let Σ be a consistent set of sentences in propositional logic.4
For every judgment set Y :
(1) Y is Σ-consistent if and only if Σ ∪ Y 6` (p ∧ ¬p) for any sentence p.
4Many authors of the judgment-aggregation literature formulate their results with respect to a general
monotonic logic L instead of propositional logic. In order to translate our framework into theirs, we have to
assume that X is a set of L-formulae, where L is a language whose symbols include the connectives ¬ and ∧
(other truth-functional connectives are defined as usual in terms of ¬ and ∧). We need to require, in addition, that
a formal provability relation ` is defined for sets of L-formulae, and assume that the system of consistent subsets
induced by ` has the following properties:
(1) {p,¬p} is inconsistent for every L-formula p;
(2) subsets of consistent sets are consistent (monotonicity);
(3) ∅ is consistent, and every consistent set has a consistent superset containing an element of each pair-set
{p,¬p} ;
(4) for all L-formulae p, q, {p, q} ` p ∧ q as well as both p ∧ q ` p and p ∧ q ` q.
Note that in this framework, Σ can simply be added to the axioms of the deductive system given by `. Hence, if
one adopts this general framework, Σ is redundant and may be deleted — or replaced by∅— wherever it occurs
in the following. (I owe the formulation of this footnote to Professor Franz Dietrich.)
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(2) Y is Σ-deductively closed if and only if for all p ∈ X , if Σ ∪ Y ` p, then p ∈ Y .
(3) Y is complete if and only if for all p ∈ X , p 6∈ Y implies ∼p ∈ Y .
(4) Y is algebraically consistent if and only if for all p ∈ X , ∼p ∈ Y implies p 6∈ Y .
Clearly, every Σ-consistent set is algebraically consistent. The converse is true if the
elements of Σ ∪ X ′ consist of pairwise different propositional variables, hence the name
algebraic, as opposed to logical, consistency.
We assume that for every p ∈ X , {p} is Σ-consistent. Let us introduce the following
abbreviations:
(1) D denotes the set of all Σ-consistent and complete subsets of X .
(2) D∗ denotes the set of all Σ-consistent and Σ-deductively closed subsets of X .
(3) D′ denotes the set of all Σ-deductively closed subsets of X .
(4) Dac denotes the set of all algebraically consistent and complete subsets of X .
(5) Da denotes the set of all algebraically consistent subsets of X .
A subset Y ⊆ X is ∈ Dac if and only if for all p ∈ X ,
p 6∈ Y ⇔ ∼p ∈ Y.
Clearly D ⊆ D∗ ⊆ D′, and D ⊆ Dac ⊆ Da.
3. JUDGMENT AGGREGATORS AND COALITIONS
Consider a non-empty (finite or infinite) set N , called the electorate
(committee/population) set. The elements of N will be referred to as individuals,
and subsets of N will be called coalitions. We denote the power-set of N by P(N).
Consider some map f : Df → P(X) with Df ⊆ DN , called judgment aggregator.
Elements of the domain Df of f will be referred to as profiles, the components of every
profile will be called individual judgment sets, whereas the elements of the range of f will
be called collective judgment sets.
f is called complete (or consistent, or deductively closed, or algebraically consistent,
respectively) if its range only consists of complete (or consistent, or deductively closed, or
algebraically consistent, respectively) judgment sets.5
There are two kinds of impossibility theorems: dictatorial and oligarchic ones. f will
be called dictatorial if and only if there exists some if ∈ N such that f(A) = Aif for all
A ∈ DN . f will be called oligarchic if and only if there exists some non-empty Mf ⊆ N
such that f(A) =
⋂
i∈Mf Ai for all A ∈ DN .
Next, we introduce some terminology and notation for the description of coalitions. For
all p ∈ X and A = 〈Ai〉i∈N ∈ Df , the coalition
A(p) := {i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}
is called the coalition supporting p given A. We say that A(p) is winning for p given A
under f if and only if p ∈ f(A).
We collect all winning coalitions6 in the set
Ff :=
{
A(p) : A ∈ DN , p ∈ f(A)} ,
5In the first part of Theorem 6, we shall only assume that f is deductively closed, hence we do not have to
assume completeness or consistency at the collective level. A similar framework has been suggested by Dietrich
and List [3]. The consistency of the collective judgment sets will follow from other properties of the judgment
aggregators under consideration.
6 The set of winning coalitions for p is the same for each profile if and only if f is independent, i.e. for every
p ∈ X and A,A′ ∈ Df ,
A(p) = A′(p)⇒ ąp ∈ f(A)⇔ p ∈ f(A′)ć .
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and we say that two coalitions C,C ′ ⊆ N are said to share the same part of a winning
coalition (denoted C ∼f C ′) if and only if there exists some U ∈ Ff such that
C ∩ U = C ′ ∩ U.
These two concepts — winning coalition and sharing the same part of a winning coalition
— will be useful in the algebraic description of systematic judgment aggregators.
Finally, we adopt the following convention as a notational device: For all A ∈ Df , we
regard f(A) as a function f(A) : X → {0, 1}, defined via
f(A)(p) =
{
1, p ∈ f(A)
0, p 6∈ f(A)
4. AXIOMS
Consider the following axioms, which are inspired by Arrow’s rationality axioms:
• A1. Finite electorate. N is finite.
• A2. Agenda richness. There are propositions p, q ∈ X such that each of the
propositions p ∧ q,¬p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q is Σ-consistent and ∈ X .
• A3. Universality. Df = DN .
• A4. Non-triviality. f is neither constantly = ∅ nor constantly = X .
• A5. Systematicity. For all p, q ∈ X and A,A′ ∈ Df : If A(p) = A′(q), then
p ∈ f(A)⇔ q ∈ f(A′).
The axiom of non-triviality, which to the knowledge of the author is new in the
judgment-aggregation literature, is satisfied in two important special cases:
Remark 1. (1) Suppose f satisfies the axiom of strict unanimity preservation, i.e. for
all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df , if A(p) = N then p ∈ f(A) and if A(p) = ∅ then
p 6∈ f(A). Then f satisfies (A4).
(2) Since∅ is not a complete subset and X not a consistent subset of X , one has∅ 6∈
D and X 6∈ D. Therefore, (A4) is satisfied if f is both complete and consistent.
The axiom of systematicity clearly implies the axiom of independence.7 Actually,
systematicity is even equivalent to independence if the agenda satisfies an additional
condition known as total blockedness (cf. e.g. Eckert and Klamler [6]). Intuitively, an
agenda is totally blocked if “any proposition in the agenda can be reached from any other
proposition in it via a sequence of conditional entailments” (List and Puppe [13]), in other
words, if one can deduce “any position on any issue from any position on any issue, via a
chain of deductions” (Dokow and Holzman [5]).
The agenda richness axiom is inspired by the ultrafilter proof of Lauwers and
Van Liedekerke [12].
5. RESULTS
Recall that
〈
P(N),∩,∪, {,∅, N〉 (wherein {B := N \ B for all B ⊆ N ) and
〈{0, 1},∧,∨,∗ , 0, 1〉 (wherein 0∗ = 1, 1∗ = 0), are Boolean algebras.8 We write 2 for
{0, 1}. We will show that non-trivial universal systematic judgment aggregators are derived
7See Footnote 6 on page 4.
8〈B,∧,∨,∗ , 0B , 1B〉 is called a Boolean algebra if and only if ∧ and ∨ are associative and commutative
operations on a non-empty set B satisfying both
∀x, y ∈ B (x ∨ y) ∧ y = (x ∧ y) ∨ y = y
and the distributivity axiom
∀x, y, z ∈ B (x ∨ y) ∧ z = (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z),
and for all x ∈ B, the element x∗ ∈ B satisfies
x ∧ x∗ = 0B , x ∨ x∗ = 1B .
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from Boolean algebra homomorphisms9 with domain P(N) and vice versa. The shell10 of
these homomorphisms will be just the the set of winning coalitions.
Lemma 2. If f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5), then the map
pi : P(N)→ 2, A(p) 7→ f(A)(p)
is well-defined. Furthermore, pi−1{1} equals Ff and is both ⊇-closed and ∩-closed.11
Note that pi does not have to be a lattice homomorphism12 (let alone a Boolean algebra
homomorphism) in general: pi need not preserve joins, since the union of two coalitions
C,C ′ which are not winning (i.e. C,C ′ ∈ pi−1{0}) can nevertheless be a winning coalition
(i.e. C ∪ C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}).13
Our first result is that complete Σ-consistent non-trivial systematic judgment
aggregators correspond to 2-valued Boolean algebra homomorphisms, and that every such
homomorphism yields a complete algebraically consistent systematic judgment aggregator.
Theorem 3. (1) If f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5) and is both consistent and complete,
then f also satisfies (A4) and pi is a homomorphism with shell Ff .
(2) Conversely, if ρ : P(N)→ 2 is a homomorphism, then the judgment aggregator
f : A 7→ {p ∈ X : ρ (A(p)) = 1}
satisfies (A2-A5) and is both algebraically consistent and complete.
Corollary 4. If f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5) and its range is ⊆ D, then Ff is an
ultrafilter.14 If, in addition, (A1) holds, then f is dictatorial.
In the following we mean by a congruence relation an equivalence relation which
respects the Boolean operations.15 Recall that two coalitions C,C ′ stand in relation ∼f
to each other if and only if they share the same part of some winning coalition.
Lemma 5. If f satisfies axioms (A2-A5), then ∼f is a congruence relation on the Boolean
algebra P(N) and the Boolean operations on P(N) induce a Boolean algebra structure
on P(N)/ ∼f .
Theorem 3 can be generalized as follows:
Every Boolean algebra can be endowed with an antisymmetric, reflexive and transitive ordering by defining
x ≤ y :⇔ x ∧ y = x
for all x, y ∈ B. For a primer of Boolean algebras and their use in logic, cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [1, Chapter 1].
9A Boolean algebra homomorphism, for short: homorphism, is a map ρ : B1 → B2 between two Boolean
algebras 〈B1,∧1,∨1,∗ , 01, 11〉 and
ŋ
B2,∧2,∨2,− , 02, 12
ő
which preserves all three Boolean operations, i.e.
ρ (x ∧1 y) = ρ (x) ∧2 ρ (y) , ρ (x ∨1 y) = ρ (x) ∨2 ρ (y) , ρ (x∗) = ρ (x)−
for all x, y ∈ B1.
10The shell of a Boolean algebra homomorphism ρ : B1 → B2 is defined as ρ−1{12}.
11In other words, if C,C′ ∈ Ff and C′′ ⊇ C, then both C ∩C′ ∈ Ff and C′′ ∈ Ff . A non-empty subset
G of P(N) that is both⊇-closed and ∩-closed is sometimes already called filter. However, we use the word filter
in the sense of proper filter and require in addition that G 6= P(N).
12A lattice homomorphism is a map between two lattices, e.g. Boolean algebras, which preserves meets and
joins.
13Consider, for example, an oligarchic f and let C be a proper subset of the set Mf of oligarchs and let
C′ =Mf \ C. Then, C,C′ ∈ pi−1{0} albeit C ∪ C′ =Mf ∈ pi−1{1}.
14A non-empty set G ⊆ P(N) is called a filter on N if and only if G 6= P(N) and G is both ⊇-closed and
∩-closed. A filter is called an ultrafilter if and only if for all C ⊆ N , either C ∈ G or N \ C ∈ G.
15More formally, a binary relation ∼C on a Boolean algebra is a congruence relation if and only if ∼C is
reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and for all x, y, x′, y′ such that both x ∼C x′ and y ∼C y′, one has
x ∧ y ∼C x′ ∧ y′, x ∨ y ∼C x′ ∨ y′, x∗ ∼C (x′)∗.
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Theorem 6. (1) If f satisfies (A2-A5) and is deductively closed, then the canonical
surjection σ : P(N)→ P(N)/ ∼f is a homomorphism with shell Ff .
(2) Conversely, if τ : P(N) → B is a homomorphism for some Boolean algebra B,
then the judgment aggregator
f : A 7→ {p ∈ X : τ (A(p)) = 1B} ,
satisfies (A2-A5) and is algebraically consistent.
Corollary 7. If f satisfies axioms (A2-A5), then Ff is a filter. If, in addition, (A1) holds,
then f is oligarchic.
6. CONCISE ALGEBRAIC PROOFS
Remark 8. Let κ be finite or infinite. Let N = ⋃j∈κ Cj be a disjoint decomposition of N
and let 〈Yj〉j∈κ be a family of Σ-consistent subsets of X . Then, each Yj can be extended to
a Σ-consistent and complete subset Zj of X . Thus, there exists a unique profile A ∈ DN
such that Ai = Zj ⊇ Yj for every i ∈ Cj and j ∈ κ.
Remark 9. If (A2) is satisfied, then {A(p) : A ∈ DN , p ∈ X} = P(N).
Proof. Due to (A2), X contains a sentence p such that both {p} and {¬p} are Σ-
consistent.16 Consider now an arbitrary coalition C. Remark 8 provides a profile A ∈ DN
such that for all i ∈ N , if i ∈ C then p ∈ Ai and if i ∈ N \C then ¬p ∈ Ai, hence p 6∈ Ai
whenever i ∈ N \ C since Ai is consistent. Therefore,
p ∈ Ai ⇔ i ∈ C
for every i ∈ N . Hence A(p) = C. So, every coalition C is of the form A(p) for some
A ∈ DN and p ∈ X . ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5). By (A5), pi is well-defined
on Dpi := {A(p) : A ∈ Df , p ∈ X}. Since Df = DN by (A3), we actually have
Dpi =
{
A(p) : A ∈ DN , p ∈ X}, hence Dpi = P(N) by Remark 9.
Since
f(A)(p) = 1⇔ p ∈ f(A)
for all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df , it is clear that pi−1{1} = Ff . Next, we shall prove that
pi−1{1} is closed under supersets and intersections. For the following, let p, q denote the
two sentences whose existence was postulated in (A3).
pi−1{1} is ⊇-closed. Let C ′ ∈ pi−1{1} and C ⊇ C ′. By (A3) and Remark 8 there
exists a profile A ∈ DN such that
∀i ∈ C \ C ′ p ∧ ¬q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N \ C ¬p ∧ q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ C ′ p ∧ q ∈ Ai.
Then A(p∧q) = C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}, whence p∧q ∈ f(A) because pi is well-defined. However,
f(A) is deductively closed, therefore p ∈ f(A), hence pi−1{1} 3 A(p) = (C \C ′)∪C ′ =
C.
pi−1{1} is ∩-closed. LetC ′, C ′′ ∈ pi−1{1}. By (A3) and Remark 8 there exists a profile
A′ ∈ DN such that
∀i ∈ C ′′ \C ′ p∧¬q ∈ A′i, ∀i ∈ N \C ′′ ¬p∧ q ∈ A′i, ∀i ∈ C ′∩C ′′ p∧ q ∈ A′i.
Then A′(p) = (C ′ ∩ C ′′) ∪ (C ′′ \ C ′) = C ′′ ∈ pi−1{1}, so p ∈ f(A′) since pi is well-
defined. On the other hand, A′(q) = (C ′∩C ′′)∪(N \C ′′) ⊇ (C ′∩C ′′)∪(C ′\C ′′) = C ′ ∈
pi−1{1}, hence A′(q) ∈ pi−1{1} because we have already seen that pi−1{1} is ⊇-closed.
Again, since pi is well-defined, A′(q) ∈ pi−1{1} implies q ∈ f(A′). So, p, q ∈ f(A′),
whence p ∧ q ∈ f(A′) because f(A′) is deductively closed and p ∧ q ∈ X . It follows that
pi−1{1} 3 A′(p ∧ q) = C ′ ∩ C ′′. ¤
16Such a sentence is also called Σ-contingent.
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Proof of Theorem 3. First, suppose that f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5) and is consistent
and complete. Then Remark 1 teaches that (A4) is satisfied. Also, Lemma 2 already affirms
that pi−1{1} = Ff . For the first part of the Theorem, it remains to verify that pi preserves
algebraic operations.
pi preserves meets. Let C,C ′ ⊆ N . Since pi−1{1} is both ⊇-closed and ∩-closed, we
have that
C ∩ C ′ ∈ pi−1{1} ⇔ (C ∈ pi−1{1}, C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}) .
Because pi is {0, 1}-valued, we deduce
pi (C ∩ C ′) = 1⇔ (pi(C) = 1, pi(C ′) = 1)⇔ pi(C) ∧ pi(C ′) = 1
and thus
pi (C ∩ C ′) = pi(C) ∧ pi(C ′).
pi preserves complements. Let A ∈ DN and p ∈ X . For every i ∈ N , the set Ai is
consistent and complete, hence
p ∈ Ai ⇔ ∼p 6∈ Ai,
so A(p) = N \A(∼p) = {A(∼p), or equivalently
(1) {A(p) = A(∼p).
On the other hand, f(A) is consistent and complete, therefore ∼p ∈ f(A) if and only if
p 6∈ f(A). Hence, we finally obtain
pi
(
{A(p)
)
= 1⇔ pi (A(∼p)) = 1⇔ ∼p ∈ f(A)⇔ p 6∈ f(A)⇔ pi (A(p)) = 0,
pi
(
{A(p)
)
= 0⇔ pi ({A(p)) 6= 1⇔ pi (A(p)) 6= 0⇔ pi (A(p)) = 1.
pi preserves joins. Let C,C ′ ⊆ N . First, suppose pi(C) ∨ pi(C ′) = 1. Then either
pi(C) = 1 or pi(C ′) = 1, hence either C ∈ pi−1{1} or C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}. Therefore, C ∪ C ′
will be the superset of an element of pi−1{1}, hence by⊇-closedness of pi−1{1}, we obtain
C ∪ C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}, that is pi (C ∪ C ′) = 1.
Next, suppose pi(C) ∨ pi(C ′) = 0, hence pi(C) = pi(C ′) = 0. We have already shown
that pi preserves complements, therefore we deduce that pi
(
{C
)
= pi
(
{C ′
)
= 1. Since we
have also already seen that pi preserves meets, we obtain that pi
(
{C ∩ {C ′) = 1 ∧ 1 = 1.
Using de Morgan’s law, pi
(
{(C ∪ C ′)) = 1, hence, again exploiting that pi preserves
complements, we arrive at pi (C ∪ C ′) = 0.
Hence, pi is a homomorphism and the first part of the Theorem established.
For the converse part of the Theorem, suppose ρ : P(N) → 2 is a homomorphism.
We have to verify that f satisfies axioms (A2-A5). We have not changed X , so (A2) is
satisfied. By definition, f satisfies (A3) and (A5).
To prove (A4), note that ρ(∅) = 0 and ρ(N) = 1 since ρ is a homomorphism,17
and by Remark 9, we can find A,A′ ∈ DN and p, q ∈ X such that A(p) = ∅ and
A′(q) = N . Then, by construction of f , both q ∈ f (A′) and p 6∈ f (A), so f (A′) 6= ∅
and f (A) 6= X .
Finally, for every A ∈ DN and p ∈ X , note that A(∼p) = {A(p) by Equation (1), and
therefore, using that ρ is a homomorphism,
p ∈ f(A) ⇔ ρ (A(p)) = 1⇔ ρ ({A(p)) = 0⇔ ρ (A(∼p)) = 0
⇔ ρ (A(∼p)) 6= 1⇔ ∼p 6∈ f(A).
Hence, f(A) is complete and algebraically consistent for every A ∈ DN . ¤
17For, since ρ preserves algebraic operations, one has (for an arbitrary C ⊆ N )
ρ (∅) = ρ
ą
C ∩ {Cć = ρ (C) ∧ ρ (C)∗ = 0
and
ρ (N) = ρ
ą
C ∪ {Cć = ρ (C) ∨ ρ (C)∗ = 1
by the definition of the complement of a Boolean algebra element .
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Proof of Corollary 4. Every shell of a 2-valued homomorphism is an ultrafilter.18
Therefore, (A2-A5) implies via Theorem 3 that Ff = pi−1{1} is an ultrafilter on N .
However, every ultrafilter F on a finite set N is principal.19 Hence, if even (A1-A5) are
satisfied, then there must be some if ∈ N such that pi−1{1} = Ff = {C ⊆ N : if ∈ C},
hence
p ∈ f(A)⇔ pi (A(p)) = 1⇔ A(p) ∈ Ff ⇔ if ∈ A(p)⇔ p ∈ Aif
for all A ∈ DN and p ∈ X . ¤
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose f satisfies (A2-A5). Then Ff = pi−1{1} is non-empty by
(A4) and ∩-closed by Lemma 2. Therefore, ∼f must be a congruence relation.20 For all
C ⊆ N , denote by |C| the equivalence class of C with respect to ∼f . Since ∼f is a
congruence relation, the operations ∧,∨,∗, introduced representative-wise via
|C| ∧ |C ′| := |C ∩ C ′| , |C| ∨ |C ′| := |C ∪ C ′| , |C|∗ := ∣∣{C∣∣
for all C,C ′ ⊆ N , are well-defined. If we define, in addition,
0∼f := |∅|, 1∼f := |N |
then through straightforward calculations one can check that〈
P(N)/ ∼f ,∧,∨,∗ , 0∼f , 1∼f
〉
is indeed a Boolean algebra. ¤
18Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [1, Chapter 1, Lemma 4.7, Theorem 4.9] The proof can be sketched as follows:
Every homomorphism h : P(N) → B translates ∩ into ∧ and translates ⊆ into ≤. (For, if C ⊆ C′ then
C ∩C′ = C, hence h(C) ∧ h(C′) = h(C ∩C′) = h(C), therefore h(C) ≤ h(C′).) It is therefore clear that
the shell H of h is ∩-closed and ⊇-closed. Moreover, as shown in Footnote 17 on page 8, both h(∅) = 0B and
h(N) = 1B , hence H 6= P(N) and H 6= ∅. Hence, H is a filter. If, in addition, h is 2-valued, then
C ∈ H ⇔ h(C) = 1⇔ h(C)∗ = 0⇔ h ą{Cć = 0
⇔ h ą{Cć 6= 1⇔ {C 6∈ H,
so H is even an ultrafilter.
19Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [1, Example 1.3.2 and Exercise 1.3.3] An ultrafilter F is called principal if
and only if there exists some i ∈ N such that F = {C ⊆ N : i ∈ C}. If N is finite and some ultrafilter F
on N were not principal, then {i} 6∈ F and hence N \ {i} for all i ∈ N . Since filters are closed under finite
intersections, we get
T
i∈N N \ {i} ∈ F, albeit
T
i∈N N \ {i} = N \
T
i∈N{i} = ∅ by de Morgan’s law, a
contradiction.
20Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [1, Chapter 1, proof of Lemma 4.3, proof of Lemma 4.4]. The proof can be
summarized as follows: Since Ff is non-empty, ∼f is reflexive. By definition, ∼f is symmetric. Since Ff is
∩-closed, ∼f is transitive. (For all C,C′, C′′ ⊆ N , if there exist U, V ∈ Ff such that C ∩ U = C′ ∩ U and
C′ ∩ V = C′′ ∩ V , then C ∩ U ∩ V = C′′ ∩ U ∩ V whilst U ∩ V ∈ Ff .) Similarly, since Ff is ∩-closed,
∼f respects ∩ and ∪: For all C0, C1, C′0, C′1 ⊆ N , if there exist U0, U1 ∈ Ff such that C0 ∩ U0 = C′0 ∩ U0
and C1 ∩ U1 = C′1 ∩ U1, then, by commutativity of ∩,
C0 ∩ C1 ∩ U0 ∩ U1| {z }
∈Ff
= C′0 ∩ C′1 ∩ U0 ∩ U1
and by distributivity of ∩,∪ also
(C0 ∪ C1) ∩ U0 ∩ U1| {z }
∈Ff
=
ą
C′0 ∪ C′1
ć ∩ U0 ∩ U1.
Finally, for all C,C′ ⊆ N , if there exists U ∈ Ff such that C ∩ U = C′ ∩ U , then
U = (U ∩ C) ∪ (U ∩ {C) = (U ∩ C′) ∪ (U ∩ {C),
whence on the one hand
{C′ ∩ U = {C′ ∩ ą(U ∩ C′) ∪ (U ∩ {C)ć = ą{C′ ∩ U ∩ C′ć| {z }
=∅
∪ ą{C′ ∩ U ∩ {Cć = {C′ ∩ {C ∩ U,
and symmetrically (by interchanging the roles of C and C′), one obtains on the other hand
{C ∩ U = {C ∩ {C′ ∩ U = {C′ ∩ {C ∩ U,
hence {C′ ∩ U = {C ∩ U .
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Proof of Theorem 6. With the notation of the proof of Lemma 5, σ : C 7→ |C| trivially
preserves the Boolean operations.
Note that for every C ⊆ N , one has
C ∼f N ⇔ ∃U ∈ Ff (C ∩ U = N ∩ U)⇔ ∃U ∈ Ff (C ∩ U = U)
⇔ ∃U ∈ Ff U ⊆ C,
hence, due to the ⊇-closedness of Ff , we obtain
|C| = |N | ⇔ C ∼f N ⇔ C ∈ Ff .
Therefore σ−1 {1∼f} = σ−1 {|N |} = Ff .
For the converse part of the Theorem, the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3
shows that f satisfies axioms (A2-A5).
Finally, suppose f were not algebraically closed. Then there would be some A ∈ DN
and p ∈ X such that both ∼p ∈ f(A) and p ∈ f(A). Hence τ (A(p)) = f(A)(p) = 1
as well as τ (A(∼p)) = g(A)(∼p) = 1. However A(∼p) = {A(p) by Equation (1), so
τ
(
{A(p)
)
= 1. On the other hand, since τ is a homomorphism and τ (A(p)) = 1, one has
τ
(
{A(p)
)
= 0, contradiction. This proves the algebraic closedness of f . ¤
Proof of Corollary 7. As the shell of a homomorphism, Ff is a filter.21
For every filter F on a finite set N , there exists some M ⊆ N such that F =
{C ⊆ N : M ⊆ C}.22 Hence, if (A1-A5) are satisfied, then there must be some Mf ⊆ N
such that pi−1{1} = Ff = {C ⊆ N : Mf ⊆ C} =
⋂
i∈Mf {C ⊆ N : i ∈ C}, so
p ∈ f(A)⇔ pi (A(p)) = 1⇔ A(p) ∈ Ff ⇔
∀i ∈Mf i ∈ A(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇔p∈Ai
⇔ p ∈ ⋂
i∈Mf
Ai
for all A ∈ DN and p ∈ X . ¤
7. CONCLUSION
Under the assumptions of agenda richness, universality and systematicity, we have
established a correspondence between deductively closed judgment aggregators and
Boolean algebra homomorphisms on the power-set of the electorate. Moreover, we
have shown that complete judgment aggregators correspond to 2-valued Boolean algebra
homomorphisms on the power-set of the electorate.
As is well-known, Boolean algebra homomorphisms can be partially characterized
through their shells, and (2-valued) homomorphism shells are the same as (ultra)filters. We
have shown that the shell of a homomorphism induced by a judgment aggregator is just the
set of all winning coalitions. Hence the set of winning coalitions is always a filter — and
even an ultrafilter if the judgment aggregator is complete. This provides an explanation for
the effectiveness of the (ultra)filter method in social choice theory.
From the (ultra)filter property of the set of winning coalitions, one can easily derive
impossibility theorems for judgment aggregators on finite electorates, even without
requiring preservation of unanimity (Pareto principle): Assuming agenda richness,
universality and systematicity, the oligarchies are the only non-trivial aggregators, and the
dictatorships are the only complete aggregators.
21Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [1, Chapter 1, Lemma 4.7]; see Footnote 18 on page 9.
22Filters are closed under finite intersections, hence
T
F ∈ F for every filter on a finite set N . This implies,
since filters are closed under supersets, {C ⊆ N : TF ⊆ C} ⊆ F. Trivially, the converse inclusion also holds.
Hence F = {C ⊆ N : TF ⊆ C} for every filter F on a finite set N .
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